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Abstract
In the past 30 years, microfinance has proven to be a viable solution for the alleviation of poverty through
international organizations, voluntary work and donations. Today, the challenge facing microfinance
institutions is self-sufficiency. Consequently, the integration of microfinance with commercial banks will
provide the necessary scale and outreach in making microfinance a self-sufficient and thus long-term solution
for the alleviation of poverty. The goal of my research was to observe the role commercial banks play in
microfinance and the challenges that these institutions encounter, having to operate in developing countries.
In this respect, the study examines the financial data of four commercial microfinance banks: the Grameen
Bank (Bangladesh), the Bank of Khyber (Pakistan), Banco Solidario, (Ecuador), Mibanco (Peru). In addition,
the study also presents recent findings in the literature on microfinance regarding the effect of different
lending types, interest rates and the delicate trade-off between profitability and outreach.
Keywords
Microfinance, commercialization, banks, Tayyeb Shabbir, Tayyeb, Shabbir, Philosophy Politics & Econ
Disciplines
Finance
This article is available at ScholarlyCommons: http://repository.upenn.edu/curej/35
Senior Honors Thesis
Commercial Banks and Microfinance
Zeynep Uğur
Submitted to the Philosophy, Politics and Economics Program at the University of 
Pennsylvania in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for Honors.
Thesis Advisor: Professor Tayyeb Shabbir
(shabbir@wharton.upenn.edu and shabbir@econ.upenn.edu )
May 4th, 2006
Acknowledgments 
1
First of all, I would like to thank Professor Tayyeb Shabbir for always being patient with his 
time and generous with his advice as he supervised my work. I also greatly appreciate all the 
help that was offered by the Lippincott library, especially that of Ms. Cynthia Cronin Kardon 
as I struggled through the data. Finally, I would like to express my gratitude to my family 
who has always showed support in every step I took in life. 
Table of Contents
2
               Chapter                                                                                                           Page
I. Introduction ………………………………………………………………   4 - 10
1.1 Background: the commercialization of microfinance
1.2 Outline and scope of the study
1.3 The failure of state-owned banks to implement microfinance
1.4 The need for commercial banks
II. The role of commercial banks in microfinance………………………….10 - 14
2.1 Direct lending
2.2 A microfinance subsidiary
2.3 Partnership with a microfinance institution
2.4 A microfinance fund: securitization 
III. Barriers to microfinance………………………………………………….12 - 19
3.1 The cultural dimension
3.2 Macroeconomic and bureaucratic impediments
3.3 The lack of credit rating agencies
3.4 Challenges for a commercial bank
IV. A study of profitability and outreach…………………………………….19 - 25
4.1 Lending types: individual, group and village
4.2 Relation between rising interest rates, and repayment rates and profitability
4.3 The trade-off between depth of outreach and profitability
               4.4 The possibilities of a mission drift
V. Analysis of data: the performance of several microfinance banks..........25 - 39
5.1 Sample Statistics: commercial banks specialized in microfinance
5.2 The Grameen Bank, Bangladesh
5.3 The Bank of Khyber, Pakistan
5.4 Banco Solidario, Ecuador
5.5 Mibanco, Peru
5.6 Conclusions on the analysis
VI. Conclusions: the future of microfinance………………………………....39 - 41
VII. Bibliography………………………………………………………………..42 - 43
I. Introduction
3
1.1 Background: the commercialization of microfinance
Poverty is one of the few challenges that every single country in the world has to deal with 
and the numbers say it all. According to the World Bank, 2.7 billion people lived on less than 
$2 a  day in  2001.  Despite  the difficulties involved in changing this  situation,  there are 
solutions and microfinance is one of them. Starting with the Grameen Bank founded by 
Mohammad Yunus in the 1970s, microfinance represented a method of lending that was to 
be  tailored  specifically  to  the  world’s  poorest  populations.  Throughout  the  years, 
microfinance  has  proved to  be  a  viable  solution  for  the  alleviation  of  poverty.  In  fact, 
nowadays, the industry is facing a new phase in its history: commercialization. 
Microfinance  was  initially  a  form of  voluntary  help  to  the  most  deprived  populations. 
However today, it also represents a market solution to the mitigation of poverty. The success 
rates and achievements of microfinance fueled the interest of various institutions, NGOs, 
banking groups and governments throughout the years and continue to do so. However, in 
order to accommodate this interest, microfinance needs to become a structured, transparent 
and regulated industry where everyone can find a role for themselves. Individuals who have 
been  working  in  microfinance  for  a  long  time  express  their  discontent  about  the 
commercialization aspect, of the notion of profit entering the field. Nevertheless, the increase 
in the participation to microfinance, whether it is on behalf of a non-profit organization or a 
bank, is the only factor that can make a significant change in the alleviation of poverty.  
At the present stage, individuals involved in microfinance agree that the demands of the 
clients of MFIs correspond to services offered by the formal financial sector. In the words of 
Malcolm  Harper  and  Sukhwinder  Singh  Arora,  this  would  mean  that  “Microfinance 
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institutions are redundant”1. What the poor have always needed is the extension of the formal 
financial  sector  for  their  use,  what  is  now  being  called  the  commercialization  of 
microfinance. According to Jean-Philippe de Schrevel, founder and Chief Operating Officer 
of BlueOrchard Finance, “Commercialization is not a goal in itself but a means of ensuring 
that financial intermediation products or services delivery are efficient”2. Indeed, Schrevel 
suggests that microfinance can be a profitable business with interest rates at market level and 
a repayment rate of 97% (larger than most commercial banks)3. Consequently, I shall argue 
that commercial banks are the most qualified to provide an extension of financial services to 
these new clients. 
1.2 Outline and scope of the study
I will first present the reasons why commercial banks are best able to serve the goal of 
microfinance. In a subsequent chapter II, I will outline the many ways in which a commercial 
bank can partake in microfinance, an involvement ranging from a direct participation to an 
indirect  provision  of  funds.  In  chapter  III,  I  will  examine  the  barriers  to  the  further 
development  of  microfinance,  especially institutional  challenges but  also macroeconomic 
ones. Later, in chapter IV, I will present a study of profitability and outreach, performed as a 
World Bank Policy Research Paper. This study seeks answers to the main economic and 
moral questions that concern the commercialization of microfinance. 
In  chapter  V,  I  will  present  my own work concerning  the performance of  a  sample  of 
commercial banks specialized in microfinance. I have first taken a random sample of banks 
from the  database  BankScope  and  I  have  looked  at  the  “Operating  Income”,  the  “Net 
1 Harper, Malcom and Arora, Sukhwinder Singh, page 1
2 De Schrevel, Jean-Philippe, page 8
3 De Schrevel, Jean-Philippe, page 8, (BlueOrchard Finance s.a. is a microfinance investment  consultancy)
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Income”, the “Net Interest Revenue”, the “Total Assets”, the “Equity” and, the “Deposits & 
Short  Term Funding”  in  the  last  accounting  year  for  22  banks  from around the  world. 
Another set of data I compiled is comprised of a ratio analysis of the sample. The ratios 
include  “Equity  /  Total  Assets”,  “Net  Interest  Margin”,  “Return  on  Average  Equity 
(ROAE)”,  “Return  on  Average  Assets  (ROAA)”,  “Cost  to  Income” and finally  “Liquid 
Assets / Customer and Short Term Funding”.
The greatest challenge in compiling this information has been to find recent figures about the 
activities of these banks. Nevertheless, in forming this sample, I was able to use the list of 
commercial banks specialized in microfinance on “The Mix Market” website. I then searched 
for the statistics on these banks in the database BankScope: only 22 banks had up to date 
financial reports and they are the ones to form my sample. In order to examine these banks 
more closely,  I  chose to look at  the case of  four prominent  banks in microfinance:  the 
Grameen Bank (Bangladesh), Bank of Khyber (Pakistan), Banco Solidario (Ecuador) and 
Mibanco (Peru). For these four commercial banks, I made a diachronic comparison of their 
financial performance (general data and ratios) for each of them for the past four or five 
years.  Furthermore,  I also made a synchronic comparison of their last  accounting year’s 
performance with that of the average of the sample. 
In chapter  VI,  I  will  present the conclusions I  have reached with regards to the role of 
commercial banks in microfinance and also suggest the most probable direction the industry 
will take in the future. Before I do so, I would like to start the survey with a historical 
outlook on the microfinance and why states have failed to provide this service. 
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1.3 The failure of state-owned banks to implement microfinance
One strategy that developing countries resorted to for economic growth was agricultural state 
banks  that  offered  a  lower  interest  rate  than  the  market  rates,  often  very  high  due  to 
significant inflation.  Nevertheless, state owned banks did not succeed in implementing a 
sustainable microfinance program in developing countries for several reasons. First of all, 
state-owned banks have eliminated the informal landing resources out of the market. This 
included friends, relatives, small business that would create a network of financial support. 
Nevertheless, the most crucial problem arose from the excess demand for loans: individuals, 
without weighing their financial prospect, resorted to these loans and many of them soon 
became non-performing loans. Indeed, the capital often became a tool of populist politics by 
being employed as a means of targeting certain social strata to obtain votes in the upcoming 
elections. 
Also, state-owned banks have destroyed the natural selection mechanism that market interest 
rates create: if the interest rates had remained at the market level, only the individuals with a 
strong commitment to their project would have applied for a loan. As a result, the truly needy 
citizens and the ones with the most reliable profile did not receive any financial aid. This 
political pressure led to another serious problem which was the forgiving of unpaid loans by 
these state-owned banks which were continually subsidized by the government: banks did not 
have an incentive to collect outstanding loans. Consequently, the state-owned banks have 
eroded the possible financial discipline that could have been instituted in the rural areas.  
1.4 The need for commercial banks
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By definition, commercial banks are banks “that offer a broad range of deposit accounts, 
including  checking,  savings,  and  time  deposits,  and  extend  loans  to  individuals  and 
businesses”4 and they are well suited to play a role in microfinance for the following reasons. 
First of all, they are regulated and supervised. Indeed, the sources of capital that are obtained 
reside in an entity independent from the MFI. This is a very important factor that guarantees 
the flow of funds to microfinance as it installs trust in donors. Indeed, one of the problems 
encountered  by  microfinance  institutions  is  the  lack  of  a  systematic  control  of  these 
organizations.  There  are  very  few  credit-rating  agencies  supervising  these  institutions 
leading, to difficulties in the procurement of capital. (This problem will be discussed further 
in part III, which deals with the barriers to microfinance). 
A second reason why commercial banks are more suited to provide microfinance concerns 
the nature of their ownership. In this respect, under a private status, the owner would want to 
make  profit  and  therefore  systematically  seek  success  in  their  projects.  The  financial 
institutions would therefore be strongly committed to the achievement of certain goals, such 
as  financial  viability.  This  point  can  be  considered  problematic  for  some advocators  of 
microfinance from an ethical point of view. 
I believe that if changes are to be made for a better financial prospect for everyone, then there 
needs to be a sense of viability instituted in society: microfinance should be an ordinary 
service that everyone has a right to access. Nevertheless, this is not to suggest that there is no 
room for both non-profit voluntary help and commercial banks in microfinance to coexist. 
Poverty is at such levels today that many individuals around the world struggle to find water 
and food every day of their life: such sufferings can only be mitigated through voluntary help 
4 www.countrystudies.us
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that is most urgently needed. In this respect, microfinance represents a subsequent level of 
help, a stage of integration for the deprived populations, a phase of adaptation to the norms of 
society with respect to basic needs and a means of becoming self-sufficient. 
Thirdly, banks can offer a wider range of financial services to the poor, a trend that can 
already be observed in the goal of MFIs today. Another reason concerns the volume of 
capital they are able to attain. Commercial banks have a wide network for getting funds and 
can consequently increase the loan numbers offered or the size. Furthermore, through their 
branches, they can facilitate the access to their services through more efficient transactions 
and thus allow a better supervision of loans and projects.
From the perspective of the bank, microfinance appears as an advantage primarily as a means 
to diversify their capital. However, the most important reward for the bank is the creation of 
mainstream bank customers in a few generations: banks can increase profits by catering to a 
larger number of clients around the world. One such example is the case of BRI (Bank 
Rakyat Indonesia), a commercial bank offering microfinance services. BRI has experienced a 
significant growth due to its large savings mobilization from its microfinance clients and was 
able to use this source to subsidize its commercial loans division during the economic crisis 
in Indonesia in 1998.5 Finally, another advantage for a bank involved in microfinance is the 
reinforcement of its public image: engaging in the alleviation of poverty will build more trust 
for the bank in the formal financial sector. 
5 Campion, Anita, page 61
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II. The role of banks in microfinance 
Commercial banks can engage in microfinance in many different ways, ranging from direct 
relations with borrowers to a more indirect participation through the raising of capital.
2.1 Direct lending
Firstly, banks can directly lend to micro entrepreneurs. Usually, a participation of this sort is 
observed in  banks founded with the aim of  solely serving the microfinance sector.  The 
pioneer in this field is the Grameen Bank founded by Muhammad Yunus in 1976, with the 
sole goal of helping the impoverished through the provision of small loans to a group of 
borrowers. Group lending consists of the attribution of a loan to each person in the group, but 
the loans are not renewed to anyone in the group if ever one borrower defaults on the loan. 
Consequently, through social pressure, the group lending method gives individuals incentives 
to be financially disciplined and to repay their loans. Another example is the ProCredit group 
which provides loans to small  and medium-sized enterprises through its 19 development 
oriented banks in Africa, Europe and Latin-American. 
2.2 A microfinance subsidiary
Secondly, banks may choose to separate their microfinance operations through the creation 
of a new subsidiary. Primarily, such subdivisions can help banks mitigate the levels of risks 
associated with lending to the poor. Nevertheless, it can also be seen as a necessary step for 
banks providing both consumer finance and microfinance, as each sector requires a different 
approach  to  business  and  a  distinct  training  of  the  employees.  Furthermore,  from  the 
perspective of the borrower, separating the microfinance services from the consumer finances 
might generate more trust and acknowledgement of the bank’s commitment to the goal of 
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reducing poverty. In this respect, Sogesol is the microfinance subsidiary of the commercial 
bank Sogebank,  the largest  commercial  bank in Haiti.  The many years of experience of 
Sogebank, bring some important advantages to Sogesol. The loans that originate from the 
microfinance subsidiary can be repaid through the branches of Sogebank. Furthermore, the 
parent company also provides other types of support to Sogesol such as human resources, 
legal affairs, auditing and marketing. 
2.3 Partnership with a microfinance institution
Thirdly,  banks  can  build  partnerships  with  microfinance  institutions.  Banks  can  lend  to 
microfinance institutions in the form of wholesale banking, and in turn, MFIs can employ the 
capital to lend to the poor. In the partnership, the bank usually provides the loan funds, the 
technology and evaluates the pricing and the levels of risk involved with the loans. On the 
other  hand,  the  MFIs  undertake  the  origination,  monitoring  and  collection  of  the  loan. 
Indeed, there are a lot of advantages for MFIs in engaging in partnerships with banks. With 
the greater amount of capital comes the increase in loan sizes, and the more branches a bank 
has, the greater the outreach achieved through geographical expansion. 
Furthermore, the bank’s personnel can also provide mentoring to MFIs in terms of improving 
the  operational  efficiencies  of  the  organization  and  making  it  aware  of  standardized 
international practices in the world of finances if the bank has reached such a standard. One 
such example is the case of ICICI Bank in India which currently has partnerships with 72 
MFIs throughout the country and aims to increase the number of its alliances to 200 by 2010. 
This kind of partnership can be the most beneficial and efficient for both the bank and the 
MFI. 
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2.4 A microfinance fund: securitization
Fourthly, commercial banks can raise funds in domestic or international capital markets for 
the lending operations of microfinance institutions. These funds can be raised in the form of 
bonds in domestic markets such as the Mibanco bond of $6 million issued in December 2002. 
Mibanco (Banco de la Microempresa S.A), a private bank established in 1992 in Peru, is 
seeking to diversify its funding sources through such bonds. Lucy Conger, in her article “To 
Market, To Market” suggests that these bonds are being bought by high net worth individuals 
or institutional investors, which suggests that microfinance is slowly becoming an integral 
part of the formal financial system. One role, large banking groups can play in microfinance 
was exemplified by Citigroup which placed and sold the Mibanco bond through a “Dutch 
auction”. Currently large commercial  banks such as Citigroup, Deutsche Bank and Rabo 
bank have microfinance funds that provide capital to MFIs. 
Deutsche  Bank  is  involved  in  microfinance  through  the  Deutsche  Bank  Microfinance 
Development  Fund  (DB  MDF).  The  bank’s  strategy  is  “to  encourage  and  establish 
relationships between local commercial financial institutions and MFIs by providing high-
risk catalytic funds as collateral for leveraged loans from local financial institutions.”6 The 
fund  makes  loans  with  “very  low-cost  financing  (1  percent  to  3  percent  a  year)  with 
maturities of one to five year”7 to the MFI which earns market interest rates on this deposit in 
US dollars. The institution obtains the equivalent sum in the local currency which can then be 
lent out to micro-entrepreneurs. Indeed, the loans “may not be used as working capital or as 
6 Deutsche Bank Microcredit Development Fund, Report of Activities, page 2
7 Deutsche Bank Microcredit Development Fund, Report of Activities, page 2
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funds for direct lending”8. Consequently, the capital provided by Deutsche bank becomes a 
form of collateral for the MFI, a form of securitization.
“A Typical DB MDF Loan Structure”  9 
III. Barriers to microfinance 
3.1 The cultural dimension
Although microfinance appears as a viable solution to alleviate poverty around the world, 
certain  issues  generate  strong barriers  to  the  development  of  the  industry.  On the  least 
8 Deutsche Bank Microcredit Development Fund, Report of Activities, page 2
9 Deutsche Bank Microcredit Development Fund, Report of Activities, page 3
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technical  side,  providers  of  microfinance  need  to  overcome the  skepticism of  the  poor, 
trapped in poverty cycles for generations: microfinance needs to be explained thoroughly to 
these new clients and advertised to microbusinesses. Furthermore, international institutions 
involved in microfinance need to express a careful understanding of the local cultures in 
order to gain the trust of the poor population, often isolated from the rest of the world. 
3.2 Macroeconomic and bureaucratic impediments
 From the perspective of the supplier of funds, the uncertainty in the economics and politics 
of the developing world, where local conditions change rapidly, comprise a major risk factor. 
For this reason, investors will be reluctant to provide capital and MFIs will have difficulties 
in financing their loans. Another problem arises from the ceilings on interest rates imposed 
by  governments:  microfinance  institutions  find  themselves  in  a  tension  between  the 
willingness  to  achieve financial  self-sufficiency through higher  interest  rates  in order  to 
provide better services and the limits imposed on their capacity to develop through the low 
interest  rates.  Nevertheless,  studies  show  that  when  interest  rates  go  above  a  certain 
threshold,  it  lowers  the  incentive  to  borrow money.  (Please  refer  to  part  IV for  more 
information). Another barrier to microfinance is formed by judiciary problems where the 
lender of capital has to face the difficulty of enforcing contracts under a week legal system, 
which is often the case in developing countries. 
For commercial institutions, the most important issue comes from the lack of information on 
the poor: banks cannot rely on formal records of the citizen such as a credit history and will 
therefore face more risks. Furthermore, it is very hard for banks to verify if an honest effort 
has been invested in the project that is undertaken with the loan. As a matter of fact, these 
14
problems show that in order to assess the credibility of clients, commercial banks need the 
experience of MFIs which sometimes have to resort to different methods of evaluation such 
as social relations and human psychology.
3.3 The lack of credit rating agencies
Credit rating in the field of microfinance is a deficiency the industry as a whole suffers from. 
It is essential for MFIs to work with big auditing and rating firms in order to secure better 
funding, to establish the trust of the capital suppliers and to be able to access other market 
mechanisms. Getting a rating can be costly for smaller MFIs. Nevertheless, funds for ratings 
can be obtained through for example the grants offered by the World Bank led consortium.10 
Five rating agencies that were approved by this consortium are Microrate, Pacific Credit 
Rating, Apoyo y Asociados, Equilibrium and Standard & Poor’s. Generally, MFIs first seek 
to be rated by a domestic rating agency and then get a second evaluation by an international 
organization such as Standard & Poor’s.
3.4 Challenges for commercial banks
There are also drawbacks to having commercial banks in microfinance. The first point that 
comes to mind is their degree of commitment to the cause involved behind this financial 
service. Commercial banks also need to address their microfinance customers with a different 
approach than the formal market financial methodology. In this respect, for issues such as 
their assessment of the client’s risk level and communications methods, the bank is mostly 
going to rely on the approach of the employee, for whom the understanding of the local 
culture  and  traditions  is  going  to  be  crucial.  Consequently,  providing  microfinance  as 
10 Conger, Lucy, page 25
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commercial banks requires the institutions to educate its staff towards the specificities of the 
client. 
According  to  Anita  Campion11,  the  main  challenges  that  the  commercialization  of 
microfinance has to face include the donor subsidies, poor regulation and supervision, and 
limited management capacity of microfinance institutions.
Campion suggests  that  one  of  the  greatest  impediments  to  the  commercialization  phase 
appears as the subsidies that are continually directed towards the industry by the donors. 
Indeed,  such  grants  are  needed  at  the  beginning  of  the  process,  at  the  start  of  a  new 
microfinance institution in order to provide for the initial capital. Furthermore, such donor 
subsidies can also be used in research projects by the MFIs. Nevertheless, these grants do not 
allow the  institution  to  reach a  self-sufficient  and efficient  level  if  they are  continually 
provided:  they  disrupt  the  expected  financial  interaction  within  the  industry’s  market 
mechanisms. Consequently,  the role of the donors is unclear with regards to the mature 
period of a microfinance institution. 
Secondly, poor regulation and supervision of MFIs is an important problem as most of the 
countries  needing  such  forms  of  support  are  unable  to  oversee  and  control  the  formal 
financial  system. The core of the problem is the lack of understanding on behalf  of the 
supervisors, of the differences between the traditional financial system and microfinance. In 
the microfinance industry, this includes a lower capital requirement, a waiver of usury rates, 
11 Anita Campion is a Senior Manager at Chemonics International, a global consulting firm promoting 
economic growth and higher living standards in developing countries. 
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a  different  risk  weighing  of  assets  for  unsecured  loans,  higher  operational  costs,  and 
requirement for a customized reporting (different types of documentation).
Thirdly, MFIs have a limited management capacity and their background explains why. Most 
of them were NGOs with a goal to reduce poverty through the provision of capital, the initial 
stage of the microfinance industry. Over time, some of them became financial institutions as 
the needs of the clients evolved. However, these MFIs do not have the capacity and the 
experience to be part of the commercial financial system and therefore need management 
capacities in many different areas such as risk management, management of information and 
internal control, marketing and customer responsiveness and human resources development 
in order to minimize the transaction costs involved with each individual. Furthermore, these 
MFIs  also  have  to  face  institutional  inefficiencies  in  order  to  achieve  financial  self-
sufficiency and attract more commercial capital. This may include the exploration of new 
technologies and a better system of accounting for expenses. 
Furthermore,  microfinance  in  rural  areas  has  had  more  difficulties  than  in  urban  areas 
according  to  Campion.  In  this  respect,  rural  banks  must  engage  in  microfinance  by 
understanding  the  local  agricultural  facts  such  as  the  crop  cycle,  the  revenues  and 
expenditures affected by the seasonal fluctuations etc. If these factors are carefully observed, 
studies have shown that rural banks can also be financially self-sufficient and even profit-
making. Indeed, the rural finance market is becoming an attractive new venture for banks in 
the face of profitable lending and stable savings. 
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Another  point  to  notice  is  the  need  for  MFIs  to  provide  for  savings  to  their  clients. 
Nevertheless, most MFIs being NGOs, it is hard for them to offer this service as they are not 
regulated financial institutions most of the time. In this respect, commercial and microfinance 
oriented  banks  can  play  an  important  role.  Indeed,  Bank  Rakyat  Indonesia  (BRI)  has 
experienced a significant growth due to its large savings mobilization and has also used this 
microfinance source to stabilize its commercial loans division during the economic crisis in 
Indonesia. 
Consequently, the commercialization of microfinance has to face several obstacles. The most 
important of all of them is the role that donor subsidies are going to play in the process. In 
this respect, they should limit their financial involvement in providing capital to the initial 
stages of the microfinance institution. In the later stages, they can help formalize the industry 
by funding for technology, technical training, regulations (credit bureaus) and information 
support  systems.  They should move away from direct  subsidies  and be  involved  in  the 
enforcement of the industry.
IV. A study of profitability and outreach 
A  World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, “Financial Performance and Outreach: A 
Global Analysis of Leading Microbanks” by Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt and Morduch, investigates 
the reason why high repayment rates observed in microfinance are not always translated into 
profitability and thus self-sufficiency for institutions. The reason behind this phenomenon is 
the effect of different lending methods according to the authors who have looked at statistics 
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for 124 MFIs (the data was obtained from www.mixmarket.org). Although over half of these 
institutions were profitable, 20% of the sample was still  subsidized. Individual, solidarity 
group and village type lending methods were the ones considered in this research. 
Table 1: Subsidized Share of Funding  12  
4.1 Lending types: individual, group and village
Individual-based lending “draws on traditional banking practices and involves a standard 
bilateral relationship between the bank and customer”13.  It is mostly predominant in East 
Asia and the Pacific. This method appears as the most vulnerable one to weak enforcement 
policies and information asymmetries. Only for this type of lending the authors observe a 
positive return on assets.  Furthermore,  less  than half  of  the  customers  are  women.  The 
authors have found that as the interest rate rises above the threshold of 60%, it generates 
lower profits  in this  category.  Furthermore,  increasing the investments on the workforce 
12 Cull, Robert; Demirgüç-Kunt, Asli and Morduch, Jonathan, page 36
13 Cull, Robert; Demirgüç-Kunt, Asli and Morduch, Jonathan, page 5
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increase  the  profits  as  the  lender  cannot  rely  on  the  client  for  information.  In  general, 
individual-based lending is practiced for larger loans ($1220 on average) and therefore with 
less  severe  poverty  levels.  Furthermore,  this  method  has  proven  to  help  MFIs  become 
financially  self-sufficient.  The  authors  found that  labor  costs  are  associated  with higher 
profitability with this method of lending as borrowers would receive larger loans once they 
are identified as reliable customers. 
Group lending,  initially  employed by the  Grameen Bank,  is  comprised of  the voluntary 
gathering of several individuals who then “assume a joint liability for the repayment of the 
loans given to the group members.”14 Group lending is practiced for individuals under more 
sever poverty situations (average loan size $431) as opposed to individual-based lending and 
therefore  costs  are  relatively  higher  than  for  individual-based  lending.  Furthermore  the 
majority of the customers for group lending are formed by women. Some form of group 
lending is  the most frequently observed lending method in South Asia and Sub-Saharan 
Africa. 
The third lending method, village banking, is a form of group lending where “each branch 
forms a single,  large group and is  given a  degree of  self-governance15”.  They make the 
smallest loans in size ($149 on average); they charge the highest interest rates and face the 
highest average costs according to the survey. Village banks are the least profitable lending 
type as they serve the poorest and their customers are largely women. Village banks are the 
lending method to be comprised of the highest share of subsidies in their capital (over 30%). 
14 Cull, Robert; Demirgüç-Kunt, Asli and Morduch, Jonathan, page 4
15 Cull, Robert; Demirgüç-Kunt, Asli and Morduch, Jonathan, page 10
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Indeed,  the authors observe that the higher the share of subsidies for a MFI, the lower the 
profitability.
Table 2: Summary Statistics by Lending Type  16  
Table 3: MFI Lending Style by Region  17  
4.2 Relation between rising interest rates, and repayment rates and profitability
The first  question the paper investigates is the relation between rising interest  rates and, 
repayment rates and profitability. With respect to individual lenders, they are more profit 
16 Cull, Robert; Demirgüç-Kunt, Asli and Morduch, Jonathan, page 35
17 Cull, Robert; Demirgüç-Kunt, Asli and Morduch, Jonathan, page 34
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generating with higher  interest  rates.  Nevertheless,  this  profitability  only exists  up  to  a 
certain level of interest rate where beyond, the demand for loans decreases. In this sample, 
the  individual-based  lenders  with  the  highest  interest  rates  enjoy  better  repayment 
performances than for lower interest rates. Contrary to this, increasing interest rates result in 
poorer performances for solidarity groups. 
Another observation was the effect of higher labor costs, as a fraction of total assets, on the 
lending  methods.  In  this  respect,  individual-based  lenders  have  experienced  higher 
profitability levels: as the loan size grows, the lenders have to pay more attention to risk 
mitigation. Nevertheless, no significant correlation was observed with solidarity groups. In 
terms of the rates of non-repayment with higher interest  rates,  the authors find that this 
observation  only  holds  for  individual-based  lenders.  Consequently,  raising  interest  rates 
result in an improved financial performance only for individual-based lenders and tend to be 
more profitable at high rates. Nevertheless, for the group lending and village banking, the 
authors did not observe a significant relation between higher interest rates versus repayment 
rates and profitability. For most group lending, the opposite of individual-based lending is 
true: their financial performances diminishes with higher interest rates. 
4.3 Trade-off between depth of outreach to the poor and profitability
Secondly, the authors investigated the trade-off between the depth of outreach to the poor 
and profitability. Their main conclusion is that achieving profitability and greater outreach to 
the poor is possible. Larger loan sizes are associated with lower average coats for individual 
and solidarity group lenders. Although larger loan could imply and lower outreach level to 
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the poor, it represents a betterment of welfare in general. Furthermore, institutions that make 
smaller loans were not found to be less profitable than other larger loan institutions. 
4.4 The possibilities of a mission drift
Finally, the paper investigates the possibilities of a mission drift “a shift in the composition 
of new clients, or a reorientation from poorer to wealthier clients among existing ones”18 and 
concludes that there is not enough evidence to show such a development. Nevertheless the 
study shows that gender can be an issue. Individual-based lenders with lower average loan 
size lend more to women. The authors also found that larger microbanks tend to give out 
larger loans and to men more frequently than to women, suggesting that bigger size implies 
less outreach but more profitability. Mission drift on the other hand is a minor concern for 
group lender and village banks as such correlations were not observed for these methods. 
Nevertheless, with larger loans by individual and group lender tend not to reach women. The 
authors conclude these are insufficient to prove mission drift but do express the willingness 
of the institutions as they grow, to cater to customers able to manage larger loans.
Table 4: Summary of Mission Drift Result  19  
18 Cull, Robert; Demirgüç-Kunt, Asli and Morduch, Jonathan, page 23
19 Cull, Robert; Demirgüç-Kunt, Asli and Morduch, Jonathan, page 42
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V. Analysis of data: the performance of several microfinance banks
5.1 Sample Statistics: commercial banks specialized in microfinance
In order to evaluate the performance of banks specialized in microfinance, I took a sample of 
banks from the database BankScope. The sample is comprised of 22 banks from around the 
world for which the range of Total Assets spans from USD 6 million to USD 554 million in 
the last accounting year.  Other available date include,  the “Operating Income”, the “Net 
Income”, the “Net Interest Revenue”, “Equity” and “Deposits & Short Term funding”. 
With respect to ratios, the first one is “Equity/ Total Assets”. It is a measure of the capital 
adequacy of a bank. It shows the role of equity within the financing structure of the bank. 
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Secondly,  the  “Net  Interest  Margin”  is  computed by dividing “Net  Interest  Income” by 
“Total Earning Assets”. It is an indicator of the profitability of the bank.
The  third,  ratio  is  the  ROAE  (Return  on  Average  Equity)  which  is  also  a  metric  of 
profitability. The ratio is calculated by dividing annual “Net Income” by “Average Equity”, 
average amount of deployed capital. 
The fourth ratio is the ROAA (Return on Average Assets), another metric of profitability. It 
shows how efficient the bank was at generating earnings from its assets. It is computed by 
dividing “Net Income” by “Total Assets”. 
The next ratio is “Cost to Income” which is also a profitability and efficiency measure for a 
bank where “Operating Expenses” are divided by “Operating Income”. 
The last ratio, which expresses the liquidity of the assets of the bank, is “Liquid Assets / 
Customer and Short Term Funding”. 
The following two tables present a synchronic analysis of the 22 banks. In the next section, I 
will present a diachronic and synchronic approach to the performance of four banks: the 
Grameen Bank, the Bank of Khyber, Banco Solidario and Mibanco. For each bank, I will 
first look at some of the general data over time and compare the last accounting year to the 
sample of the 22 banks. I will then proceed in the same way for the analysis of the ratio: I 
will first present a diachronic observation of the ratios and then compare the ratio from the 
last accounting year to that of the ratios of the sample of 22 banks. 
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5.2 The Grameen Bank, Bangladesh
Grameen Bank: General Data (Source: BankScope)
2004 2003 2002 2001
th USD th USD th USD th USD
Operating Income 51243 42072 n.a. 37569
Net Income 6,949 6,082 n.a. 1,026
Net Interest Revenue 31,390 27,881 n.a. 35,318
Total Assets 554,031 463,950 390,366 347,035
Equity 126,602 140,077 99,639 36,747
Deposits & Short term funding 417,720 321,850 290,190 306,637
The Grameen Bank has been the pioneer in microfinance since its creation in 1976. The latest 
data from BankScope show that “Total Assets”, “Equity” and “Net Income” have increased 
from 2001 to 2004, although there was a slight decrease for “Equity” in 2004. We can also 
see that the “Operating Income” has increased throughout the four years. Furthermore, we 
can see that the general trend in the “Net Interest Revenue” has been a decrease since 2001. 
Finally,  “Deposits  & Short  term funding”  has  generally  increased  over  the  four  years. 
Consequently, as the “Net Interest Revenue” has decreased, the bank must have resorted to 
other sources of financing such as the increase in “Deposits & Short term funding”.
In comparing the Grameen Bank’s performance in 2004 to its peers in the sample, we can see 
that it has a “Net Income” of USD 7 million, higher than the average USD 5.96 million. The 
same is true for its “Interest Revenue”, USD 31 million, whereas the average is USD 27.67 
million. The Grameen Bank has the highest “Total Assets” in the group, USD 554 million 
and the highest “Deposits & Short term funding”, USD 418 million. 
Grameen Bank: Ratios (Source: BankScope)
2004 2003 2002 2001
28
Capital
Equity / Total Assets 22.85 30.19 25.53 10.59
Operations
Net Interest Margin 7.39 8.07 n.a. 12.18
Return On Average Assets (ROAA) 1.39 1.43 n.a. 0.3
Return On Average Equity (ROAE) 5.3 5.11 n.a. 2.79
Cost To Income Ratio 53.71 61.45 n.a. 63.77
Liquidity
Liquid Assets / Cust & ST Funding 31.56 31.21 26.47 31.81
With respect to the ratios, the first one, “Equity / Total Assets” show us that the share of 
assets financed by equity has been irregular although the general trend has been an increase 
from 2001  to  2004.  The  “Net  Interest  Margin”  computed  by  interest  income  over  the 
earnings assets, exhibits a decreasing share of the interest income in the earnings from the 
assets. Indeed, as the “Net Interest Revenue” has also been decreasing since 2001, this could 
suggest that the bank has to rely on other sources of income for its operations and thus had to 
suffer a decrease in self-sufficiency over the past few years. On the positive side, the ROAA 
and ROAE have generally increased from 2001 to 2004. 
A higher  ROAA suggests  a more efficient use of the bank’s assets to generate income. 
Nevertheless, an increase in the ROAE could signal an increase of financing through debt. 
The ROAE is computed by as follows: ROAE = Net Income / Stockholders’ Equity. We 
know that assets equal to the sum of stockholders’ equity and liabilities. In other words, 
stockholders’ equity equals assets minus liabilities. Consequently, if the ROAE is increasing, 
either “Net Income” is increasing or “Stockholders’ Equity” decreasing. If it is the later, that 
would mean an increase in liabilities. From the previous table, we have seen that the “Net 
Income” has increased over the four years. Nevertheless, the bank’s reliance on debt has 
probably increased too as the “Net Interest Revenue” has decreased. In addition, the “Cost to 
Income” ratio has decreased since 2001. Finally, “Liquid Assets / Cust & ST funding” ratio 
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has been fairly stable over the four years, implying that the bank was able to maintain, if not 
increase the number of loans given to customers. 
Doing a synchronic comparison with the sample of banks, we can see that the bank’s “Equity 
/ Total Assets” ratio is very close to the average. Nevertheless, for “Liquid Assets / Cust & 
ST funding” ratio is one standard deviation above the mean, very close to the maximum of 
the sample. With respect to the operations ratios, the bank is significantly lower than the 
average for the ROAE and the ROAA, suggesting that the bank has room to improve its 
efficiency compared to other banks. Furthermore, the “Net Interest Margin” is also lower 
than the mean. We can see that the “Cost to Income Ratio” is significantly lower than the 
average, more than one standard deviation away, thus showing that the bank is relatively 
profitable. Lastly, the “Liquid Assets / Cust & ST funding” ratio is close to the highest of the 
sample, suggesting that the bank is more able to fund projects and give out loans than its 
peers. 
5.3 The Bank of Khyber, Pakistan
Bank of Khyber: General Data (Source: BankScope)
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2004 2003 2002 2001 2000
th USD th USD th USD th USD th USD
Operating Income 13,683 16,461 11,522 7,611 6,094
Net Income 4,381 5,324 2,417 3,795 -2,712
Net Interest Revenue 12,381 15,328 -2,716 -3,220 -2,359
Total Assets 402,853 331,948 321,911 283,070 264,626
Equity 30,812 27,313 21,492 18,346 10,951
Deposits & Short term funding 338,516 287,066 265,084 244,570 235,375
In terms of the general data, the “Operating Income” and the “Net Income” have increased 
throughout the five years for the Bank of Khyber. Although the “Net Interest Revenue” was 
up to $15,328,000 in 2003 from the negatives in 2000 and 2001, the bank saw a decrease in 
2004 down to $ 12,381,000. In terms of the “Total Assets”, the bank was able to increase it 
significantly throughout the years. We can also see that the general trend for the “Deposits & 
Short term funding” was an overall increase until 2004. 
In terms of comparing the bank to the sample, we can see that it has a significantly lower 
“Operating Income” and “Net Income”. This is also true for its “Net Interest Revenue” where 
the average is $27,670,000. The bank has the second largest “Total Assets” and is fairly close 
to the average in the amount of “Equity”. Finally,  its “Deposits & Short  term funding”, 
$339,000,000, is significantly above the average $223,708,400.
Bank of Khyber: Ratios (Source: BankScope)
2004 2003 2002 2001 2000
Capital 
Equity / Total Assets 7.65 8.23 6.68 6.48 4.14
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Operations 
Net Interest Margin 3.84 5.27 -1.02 -1.36 -1.09
Return on Average Assets (ROAA) 1.21 1.61 0.79 1.42 -1.1
Return on Average Equity (ROAE) 15.31 21.6 11.92 26.37 -23.42
Cost to Income Ratio 36.04 35.61 37.37 51.25 58.88
Liquidity 
Liquid Assets / Cust & ST Funding 32.8 18.81 55.16 51.38 55.55
In terms of the ratios, the general trend is an increase in “Equity / Total Assets”, although 
there was a slight decrease for 2004, which shows that equity has played a larger role in the 
financing structure of the bank over time. With respect to the operations ratios, the “Net 
Interest Margin” has been negative from 2000 to 2002, but was at 5.27 for 2003 and stayed 
positive for the following year, although it decreased. The overall tendency for the ROAA 
was an increase however the ROAE has been very irregular.  The changes in the ROAE 
suggest that the financing means of the bank are unstable, whether through debt or equity. 
However, a more positive point is the decrease of the “Cost to Income Ratio” since 2000. 
Finally, we can see that the liquidity of the bank has decreased over the years, which would 
imply that the bank is able to accommodate fewer loans. 
When we compare the performance of the bank with its peers in the sample, we can see that 
the bank is more than one standard deviation below the average for “Equity / Total Assets”. 
This is also the case for the “Net Interest Margin” which actually is the lowest of the sample. 
These two observations suggest that the bank might be resorting exterior sources of funding 
rather than equity or interest revenue. Whereas the ROAE is very close to the average, a 
positive point for the bank, the ROAA is much lower than the mean. In terms of the “Cost to 
Income Ratio” the bank is the best performer: it has the lowest value in the sample (36.04) 
and with the “Liquid Assets / Cust & ST Funding” (32.8), the bank has a value very close to 
the maximum (32.9). 
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5.4 Banco Solidario, Ecuador
Banco Solidario: General Data (Source: BankScope)
2005 2004 2003 2002 2001
th USD th USD th USD th USD th USD
Operating Income 46,900 34,000 26,600 20,400 10,400
Net Income 3,200 3,600 3,400 3,000 1,200
Net Interest Revenue 9,500 9,300 7,700 7,800 3,100
Total Assets 297,600 256,600 181,600 158,200 113,400
Equity 23,800 20,700 17,400 13,000 11,000
Deposits & Short term funding 218,400 190,900 136,900 127,600 96,900
Banco Solidario exhibits a stable financial situation throughout the five years. In most cases 
the numbers  have doubled from 2001 to  2005,  which  is  the  case  for  the  “Equity” and 
“Deposits & Short term funding”, if not approximately tripled, such as “Operating Income”, 
“Net Income”, “Net Interest Revenue” and “Total Assets”. 
Comparing this outlook with the sample, we can see that has an “Operating Income” higher 
than  the  average,  but  a  “Net  Income”  lower  than  the  mean.  Furthermore,  its  “Interest 
Revenue” is also significantly lower, more than one standard deviation away. Although the 
bank ranks third in terms of “Total Assets”, it is also significantly lower than the average in 
“Equity”, more than one standard deviation. 
Banco Solidario: Ratios (Source: BankScope)
2005 2004 2003 2002 2001
Capital 
Equity / Total Assets 8 8.07 9.58 8.22 9.7
Operations 
Net Interest Margin 3.87 4.83 5.18 6.62 3.95
Return on Average Assets (ROAA) 1.16 1.64 2 2.21 1.3
Return on Average Equity (ROAE) 14.38 18.9 22.37 25 11.71
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Cost to Income Ratio 78.68 87.06 84.96 81.37 95.19
Liquidity 
Liquid Assets / Cust & ST Funding 17.9 15.77 12.56 7.45 14.65
When we look at the performance of Banco Solidario with respect to ratios, we can notice 
that the “Equity/ Total  Assets” ratio has been quite stable over the course of five years, 
although  there  was  a  slight  decrease.  However,  the  “Net  Interest  Margin”,  3.87,  has 
decreased to a level lower than its 2001 performance of 3.95, after having showed some 
improvements. The “Cost to Income Ratio” has decreased over time.  We can also see that 
the ROAA has not increased, which would suggest that the bank was not able to increase its 
efficiency in terms of its assets. 
However, we see that the ROAE has increased, implying that the bank might have resorted to 
financing with debt, through an increase in liabilities (Recall the denominator of the ROAE, 
Stockholders’  Equity  =  Assets  –  Liabilities),  or  that  the  assets  might  have  increased 
significantly. From the previous table, we had observed that the assets of the bank had almost 
tripled. Nevertheless, the ROAA has decreased. Consequently, Banco Solidario is a bank that 
is abundant in capital, but that was not able to make use of it efficiently. With respect to the 
liquidity of the bank, we can see that it has increased over the years, suggesting that Banco 
Solidario’s capability to give out loans has increased. 
In comparison to its peers, the bank is significantly below the average in “Equity / Total 
Assets” and in the “Net Interest Margin”. However, Banco Solidario is in the range of the 
mean in terms of its other operations ratios such as the ROAE, the ROAA and the “Cost to 
Income Ratio”. Finally, we can see that the “Liquid Assets / Cust & ST Funding” ratio is also 
close to the average of the sample.
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5.5 Mibanco, Peru
Mibanco: General Data (Source: BankScope)
2005 2004 2003 2002 2001
th USD th USD th USD th USD th USD
Operating Income 54572 43855 40899 29852 19486
Net Income 13,009 7,807 7,248 5,435 3,165
Net Interest Revenue 53,989 43,672 40,889 30,478 19,515
Total Assets 254,455 162,763 138,984 108,281 73,820
Equity 42,847 37,176 31,909 23,847 18,237
Deposits & Short term funding 197,637 106,648 83,252 70,546 50,937
The last bank, Mibanco, exhibits an increasing trend in all of the variables. We can see that 
some have almost doubled, such as the “Operating Income”, the “Net interest Revenue” and 
the “Equity”.  Furthermore,  some variables  have tripled,  or  quadrupled such as  the “Net 
Income”, the “Total Assets” and the “Deposits & Short Term funding”. 
When comparing Mibanco to the sample, we can see that it is the fourth largest bank with 
respect to “Total Assets” but has a significantly higher “Operating Income” than the average. 
It  also has  the highest  “Net  Income” in  the sample,  with also the highest  “Net  Interest 
Revenue”. These would suggest that the bank is highly self-sufficient and profitable, with a 
high degree of success in its loans. Furthermore, it has“Equity” and “Deposits & Short Term 
funding” levels close to the average.
Mibanco: Ratios (Source: BankScope)
2005 2004 2003 2002 2001
Capital 
Equity / Total Assets 16.84 22.84 22.96 22.02 24.71
Operations 
Net Interest Margin 29.46 31.61 36.92 37.95 37.04
Return on Average Assets (ROAA) 6.34 5.04 5.82 6.02 5.25
Return on Average Equity (ROAE) 33.19 22.03 25.84 26.06 18.79
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Cost to Income Ratio 57.94 60.92 60.31 64.92 66.17
Liquidity 
Liquid Assets / Cust & ST Funding 12.06 17.07 10.82 11.34 6.61
The “Equity / Total Assets” ratio suggests that the share of equity in assets has decreased 
over the course of the five years and so has the “Net Interest Margin”. These would suggest 
that the bank’s revenue from other sources of income have increased in these years. We can 
see that  the ROAA has  been fairly stable  since 2001 whereas the ROAE has increased 
significantly,  probably  due  to  the  increase  in  “Total  Assets”  (see  previous  table)  or  an 
increase in liabilities. Although the “Cost to Income Ratio” has decreased slightly, it has been 
fairly constant. Finally, a positive point for the bank is the increase in its liquidity level. 
Comparing Mibanco to the sample, we can see that the “Equity / Total Assets” is lower that 
situation is similar for the liquidity level of the bank. Nevertheless, Mibanco appears has a 
well-run bank as it has significantly higher ratios than the average in operations such as the 
“Net Interest Margin”, the ROAE, the ROAA and the “Cost to Income Ratio”. All of these 
suggest that the bank is making an efficient use of its resources.
5.6 Conclusions on the analysis
Consequently, we can say that the four banks with the highest total assets are exhibiting a 
positive outlook in terms of the growth of their revenue and their assets. Their deposits have 
also increased continually throughout the years suggesting that they were able to serve an 
increasing number of customers. Furthermore, they were able to make a more efficient use of 
their  assets  and  equity,  expressed  through  the  increase  in  the  ROAA  and  the  ROAE. 
Nevertheless, they are still struggling to maintain consistency: even the Grameen Bank which 
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is the most experienced in microbanking, has seen its “Net Interest Margin” fall in the last 
years,  suggesting a fall  in the interest  revenue.  The Bank of Khyber had three years of 
negative “Net Interest Revenue” before 2003. In this respect, stability is a key factor that 
microfinance banks need to strive for in order to generate a regular source of funding and to 
maintain self-sufficiency, the overarching goal of the microfinance sector in general. 
VI. Conclusions: the future of microfinance
During its relatively short history, micro credit has evolved into microfinance, reflecting the 
drastic change in the approach to the alleviation of poverty around the world. The industry 
has  started  through the  volunteering  of  idealist  NGOs and has  now come to  embody a 
morally  acceptable  sub-industry  for  the  formal  financial  market:  “Microfinance  presents 
itself as a new market-based strategy for poverty reduction”20. Microfinance is now seen as a 
“win-win” situation for both partakers: the lender of the capital and the small borrower. In 
this approach, the role the subsidies should be play would ideally be limited to the initiation 
of a microfinance project and then the organization would reach a self-sustaining,  if not 
profit making entity through the savings of the clients, the bonds that are being issued and the 
funds from commercial sources. 
According  to  Jean-Philippe  de  Schrevel,  founder  of  BlueOrchard  Finance,  the  future  of 
microfinance lies in the formal financial market that will make the industry self-sustainable. 
The goal of microfinance in the future is to become a transparent and regulated industry. In 
this respect, the most important development to be achieved is the linkage of microfinance to 
20 Armendáriz de Aghion, Beatriz and Jonathan Morduch, page 16
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the commercial capital market in order to satisfy the growing needs of the clients of this 
industry. 
Furthermore he suggests that the role of international investments in microfinance remains 
crucial in the achievement of these goals. International funding can widen the opportunities 
presented  by  a  local  capital  market  and  can  isolate  MFIs  from economic  uncertainties 
observed in developing countries. Secondly, this international capital has the potential to 
attract more international businesses in the industry and allow the offering of more diverse 
services to the poor. Consequently, international investments are expected to have a positive 
impact by bringing dynamism to the commercial financing of MFIs. 
BlueOrchard,  as  a  microfinance  investment  consultancy,  portrays  this  new approach  to 
microfinance  by  managing  debt  funds  and  attracting  commercial  investors  to  the 
microfinance industry. BlueOrchard Finance manages and advises investments worth USD 
135  million  through  partnerships  with  other  financial  institutions.  BlueOrchard  also 
developed the first fully commercial microfinance fund, Dexia Micro-Credit, and continues 
to create other funds, including local microfinance funds. 
Consequently,  microfinance  can  be  a  commercial  business  in  addition  to  its  non-profit 
aspect;  but  it  is  a  different  one,  not  to  be  approached  like  consumer  finances.  The 
participation of commercial banks in microfinance requires that they first and foremost have 
an extensive network of branches, an understanding of local cultures, make use of economies 
of scale and train their credit agents for a successful monitoring of a loan. 
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Nevertheless,  the  direct  involvement  of  a  commercial  bank  in  microfinance  without 
experience can be costly. In this respect, a partnership with a microfinance institution or an 
indirect participation might be preferable.  In any case, in the near future, we can expect 
more commercial  banks to be involved in microfinance. This participation is most likely 
going to be in an indirect fashion such as securitization through microfinance bonds and 
funds. Indeed, this suggests that the microfinance industry is in the right direction, creating 
ties with the formal financial system in order to achieve the necessary scale to make the 
required changes for the financially deprived population of the world. 
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